Resistance to Chinese Nine Dotted Line Claim of the Spratly Islands and solution

provided by Common Heritage of Mankind by Muhammad Naguib Abdul Malik,
(2015) 19 JUUM 59 - 71
Resistance to Chinese Nine Dotted Line Claim of the Spratly Islands and Solution 
Provided by Common Heritage of Mankind
(Tentangan terhadap Tuntutan China ke Atas Pulau Spratly dan Penyelesaian 
Disediakan oleh Warisan Bersama Manusia)
MUHAMMAD NAGUIB ABDUL MALIK
ABSTRACT
The Spratly Islands issue has been contentious for many South East Asian countries (namely Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines 
and Brunei) mainly because China claims every inch of the Spratly Islands. The problem is further exacerbated when 
China has taken steps in claiming her rights upon the Spratly Islands which clearly has caused tensions to run high with 
its Southeast Asian neighbours. This Article views the solution offered by Common Heritage of Mankind which originated 
from the Islamic International Law (Siyar) in dealing with the issue of the Spratly Islands. 
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ABSTRAK
Isu Kepulauan Spratly merupakan isu perbalahan bagi negara-negara Asia Tenggara (iaitu Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Philippines dan Brunei) terutamanya kerana China menuntut setiap inci Kepulauan Spratly. Masalah ini diburukkan 
lagi apabila China telah mengambil langkah-langkah dalam menuntut hak-hak mereka ke atas Kepulauan Spratly yang 
jelas telah menyebabkan ketegangan dengan negara-negara jiran Asia Tenggara itu. Artikel ini melihat penyelesaian 
yang ditawarkan oleh Warisan Bersama Manusia yang berasal dari undang-undang Islam Antarabangsa ( Siyar ) dalam 
menangani isu Kepulauan Spratly.
Kata kunci: Undang-undang Islam antarabangsa; warisan bersama manusia; Siyar; Kepulauan Spratly; China; Malaysia; 
Vietnam; Filipina; Brunei; Taiwan 
INTRODUCTION
China has laid claim to the entire Spratly Islands 
which countries like Vietnam, Brunei, Philippines and 
Malaysia do not agree with. The complexity of Chinese 
Nine Dotted Line Claim is further exacerbated by the 
introduction of 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 
regarding offshore territory.1 The parties to 1982 LOSC 
are entitled to 200 nautical miles (nm) of maritime and 
jurisdictional exclusivity.2 Thus, the parties to 1982 
LOSC are granted access to fi shing and mining rights to 
the Seabed.3 However, Chinese Nine Dotted Line Claim 
upon the entire Spratly islands is highly debatable because 
the Spratly Islands is beyond 200 nm from the Chinese 
mainland.
This article discusses the resistance of the Chinese 
nine dotted line claim to the entire Spratly Islands by 
South East Asian countries namely Malaysia, Vietnam, 
Philippines and Brunei Then, this will provide the basic 
principles of international law as contained in the 1982 
LOSC with an assessment of Chinese position under it. 
This article will also assess the mechanism available in 
Common Heritage of Mankind which originated from 
Islamic International Law (Siyar) in solving the issue of 
the Spratly Islands. 
CHINESE CLAIM OVER THE SPRATLY ISLANDS
CHINESE CLAIMS AND AMBITIONS
Chinese Nine Dotted Line Claim on the South China Sea 
is based on its nine-dotted lines map which covers roughly 
more than 90% of the South China Sea.4 At the same time, 
China also claims that it has historical title upon the South 
China Sea.5 China claims that the discovery of the Spratly 
Islands started during the Han Dynasty in 2nd century 
B.C.6 China’s scholars also contend that Chinese graves 
could be found on the Spratly Islands but the presence of 
the graves would not demonstrate continuing presence 
or administration.7
Dzurek8 stipulates that in 1902, the Chinese imperial 
government sent an expedition naval task force to inspect 
and erect Chinese fl ags on some islands in the South 
China Sea, however, it is not clear that whether the 
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expedition went beyond the Paracel Islands and reached 
the Spratly Islands. In 1911, the Chinese Republic later 
placed the Paracel Islands under the administration of 
a county on Hainan Island but not the Spratly Islands.9 
Thus, this would clearly signify that China would not 
have any claim upon the Spratly Islands. 
MOTIVATIONS FOR CHINESE NINE DOTTED LINE CLAIM 
China’s motivation in claiming the Spratly Islands are 
based on the following factors:
1. Minerals, Oil and Gas Deposits
 It is believed that the Spratly Islands contain mineral, 
oil and gas deposits, and China is known for having 
insatiable hunger for energy and minerals for the 
development of China’s economy.10
2. Fishing Rights
 The Spratly Islands’ waters are a haven for aquatic 
creatures. As the shores of the mainland China has 
yielded low numbers of fi sh, Chinese fi sherman 
would fi sh at the Spratly Islands for the purpose of 
feeding its growing population.11 
3. Nationalism
 The sentiment of national pride is very high in China. 
China would use this national zeal in order to bolster 
its populace support to its claims.12
4. Shipping Lanes
 Many oil tankers ply the route of South China Sea 
to reach many countries such as Japan and Russia.13 
Thus, Chinese control of the Spratly Islands would 
control and monitor the sea lanes and to some extent, 
interject such oil shipments to other countries. 
5. Security Buffer Zones
 Chinese Nine Dotted Line Claim of the entire South 
China Sea is for the purpose of protecting mainland 
China from foreign naval forces, especially the U.S 
Naval Forces.14
6. Ballistic missile submarine bastion
 Ronald O’Rourke, the Specialist in Naval Affairs 
observed that “China has built submarine base 
at Hainan Island in the South China Sea. Some 
observers believe that China in coming years will 
operate ballistic missile submarines from the base as 
part of China’s strategic nuclear deterrent force.”15
RESISTANCE AND COUNTERCLAIM BY 
CERTAIN SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES TO 
CHINESE NINE DOTTED LINE CLAIM 
RESISTANCE AND COUNTERCLAIM BY CERTAIN 
SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES
According to Malcolm N. Shaw,16 “control, although 
needing to be effective, does not necessarily have to 
amount to possession and settlement of all of the territory 
claimed. Precisely what acts of sovereignty are necessary 
to found title will depend in each instance upon all the 
relevant circumstances of the case, including the nature 
of the territory involved, the amount of opposition (if any) 
that such acts on the part of the claimant state have aroused, 
and international reaction.” In furtherance, Malcolm N. 
Shaw stated that “the states succeeding in its claim for 
sovereignty over terra nullius over the claims of other 
states will in most cases have proved not an absolute title, 
but one relatively better than that maintained by competing 
states and one that may take into account issues such as 
geography and international responses.”
Based on the aforesaid quotations, it is said that 
the successful of a “claim for sovereignty over terra 
nullius” by a state is proved not to have “an absolute 
title” but a better title than “competing states” but the 
“geographical and international responses” may to take 
into account to dispute such title. Thus, China’s title on 
the Spratly Islands is “better than the competing states 
when it comes to terra nullius territory” but “geographical 
and international responses” have to take into account to 
dispute such China’s title on Spratly Island. For example, 
the geographical location of Spratly Island is beyond 200 
nm (as defi ned by 1982 LOSC) from the Chinese mainland 
and at the same time, the Spratly Islands is uninhabitable, 
unable to sustain life and or have non-economic activities. 
In regards to international response, the Chinese Nine 
Dotted Line Claim to the Spratly Islands has indeed 
caused opposition from countries such as Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Brunei and Philippines. The resistance or 
opposition to the Chinese nine dotted line claims to the 
Spratly Islands hinges on the following issues:
1. Actions by China’s Predecessor Governments
 The actions by China’s predecessor governments 
are very important in order to determine whether 
the present government of China has the legitimacy 
to claim sovereignty over the South China Sea, and 
especially the Spratly Islands. In 1902, the Chinese 
Imperial Government sent a naval expedition to 
inspect the islands in the South China Sea. The troops 
erected the Chinese Imperial Government fl ags on 
some islands. However, it was not clear whether the 
expedition have gone beyond the Paracel Islands.17 
In 1911, the Chinese Republic placed the Paracel 
Island under the administration of a county of Hainan 
Island. This action of the Chinese Republic does not 
show that the Spratly Islands are under the same 
administration.18 
2. The 1928 Commission Report
 This 1928 Commission Report which was released by 
the Chinese government contended that the Paracel 
Islands are regarded as the southernmost territory of 
China. This 1928 Commission Report has weakened 
the Chinese claim of sovereignty of the Spratly 
Islands.19
3. Historic Water Jurisdiction
 China claims the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands 
based on discovery and administration.20 China 
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claims the Chinese tradition sea boundary line, 
which is related to all islands based on the Nine 
Dotted Lines. On the other hand, Taiwan claims 
that the U-shaped line in the South China Sea is a 
body of water under the Jurisdiction of Republic of 
China, which is based on Historic Waters of China.21 
Neither China nor Taiwan have exercised control on 
the “Historic Waters of China.” At the same time, 
the International Law only recognised the status 
of internal waters or territorial sea and 200 nm 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) territory and not 
“Historic Waters.”22
4. Chinese Nine Dotted Line Claim is not Consistent 
with Customary International Law and LOSC 1982
 Chinese Nine Dotted Line Claim is not consistent 
with the customary International law and LOSC 1982 
which must derive from land features. The basic 
principle of the law of the sea is ‘the land dominates 
the sea’, meaning that it is the territorial sovereignty 
of coastal states that generates their sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction in the EEZ and over the continental 
shelf.23 In fact, the Spratly Islands is not within 200 
nm off the China coastline which does not give China 
sovereignty over it or make it part of its territory.
5. “Rock” as defi ned in Article 121 of 1982 LOSC
 The Spratly Islands is a group of merged and 
submerged rocks which are unable to sustain 
habitation or economic life of their own. Thus, it is 
a misnomer to call them the Spratly Islands, instead 
they should be called the “Spratly Rocks.” Only Itu 
Aba Island or Taiping Island is said to have a natural 
source of fresh water which is capable of fulfi lling 
the requirement of being able to sustain human 
habitation.24 However, an artifi cial economic life to 
sustain human habitation, which is supported by a 
distant population, in order to gain control over an 
extended maritime zone, is not suffi cient.25 Thus, a 
rock which is defi ned in Article 121 of 1982 LOSC 
as that which cannot sustain human habitation 
or economic life of its own shall not have EEZ or 
continental shelf.26
6. Continuous and Effective Acts of Occupation
 China is unable to prove “continuous and effective 
acts of occupation,” which is required by international 
maritime law in order for China to claim sovereignty 
over the Spratly Islands.28 The distance from 
mainland China exacerbates the problem of China 
being unable to prove effective occupation.
MALAYSIAN CLAIM
The disputes concerning the Spratly Islands, which are 
claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, 
Brunei and Malaysia due to their vital and strategic 
location, coupled with their rich natural resources i.e. oil 
and gas and fi sh resource. Vietnam holds the lion share 
of the Spratly Islands, which is about 26, followed by the 
Philippines which holds ten, China holds eight, Malaysia 
holds seven and Taiwan holds two.29
Malaysia started its claim upon the Spratly Island 
in 1979, being the most recent among all claimants. 
Malaysia published a map on 21 December 1979 
delimiting its continental shelf claim boundaries,30 the 
1979 Malaysian map clearly points out a portion of the 
Spratly Islands belonging to Malaysia, which includes a 
dozen tiny reefs and atolls in the south-eastern portion of 
the Spratly Islands, for example Amboyna Cay, Southwest 
Shoal, Gloucestere Breakers, Barque Canada Reef, 
Northeast Shoal, Glasgow Shoal, North Viper Shoal, 
Ardasier Breaker, Mariveles Reef, Lizzie Weber Reef and 
Commodore Reef. Malaysia also proclaimed the EEZ in 
April 1980 but Malaysia has not delimited the EEZ.31
The 1979 Malaysian Map and the proclamation of the 
EEZ in April 1980 caused controversies or frictions with 
other claimants of the Spratly Island, especially China, the 
Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam. Malaysia’s prime reason 
for claiming the Spratly Islands is that the sovereignty 
of the Spratly Islands falls within Malaysia’s continental 
shelf 32 and 200 nm EEZ. Malaysia claims Pulau Kecil, 
Amboyna, Terumbu Ibi (Ardasir Reef), Terumbu Layang-
Layang (Swallow Reef), Terumbu Samarang Barat Besar 
(Royal Charlotte Reef) and Terumbu Semarang Barat 
Kecil (Louisa Reef).33 Malaysia, in June 1983, instructed 
its troops to land in Terumbu Layang-Layang which is 
about 64 km southeast of Amboyna Island and Malaysia 
placed accommodation structures on the atoll.34 The 
occupation of the Terumbu Layang-Layang was part of 
the annual naval exercise in the South China Sea under 
the Five Power Defence Arrangement involving air and 
naval units from Malaysia, New Zealand, Australia and 
Singapore.35 Right after the occupation, Malaysia placed 
its three F5E jet fi ghters in Labuan in order to provide 
cover for the occupying troops. The Government of MAP 1. Map of the Nine Dotted Lines Submitted by 
China to the United Nations in 200927
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Malaysia views the placement of its three F5E jet fi ghters 
in Labuan and the occupation of the Terumbu Layang-
Layang as justifi ed due to indications that Vietnam wanted 
to occupy the island.36
Malaya’s (and later Malaysia) closest foreign ally 
was her colonial master i.e. the Great Britain, which 
entered in 1957 a defence pact37 whereby the Great 
Britain guaranteed the defence of Malaya/Malaysia. The 
full title of the 1957 defence pact treaty is “Agreement 
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
Federation of Malaya on External Defence and Mutual 
Assistance.”     
In 1967, the military pact with Malaysia ended and 
the defence pact was replaced in 1971 with the Five 
Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) by which Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore agreed 
to co-operate in the area of defence, and to ‘consult’ each 
other in the event of external aggression or the threat of 
attack on Malaysia or Singapore.38 In the Exchange of 
Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government 
of Australia and the Government of Malaysia regarding 
External Defence (Kuala Lumpur, 1 December 1971, 
retrospective entry into force: 1 November 1971),39 defence 
arrangements were made between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of Malaysia.  
However, this defence treaty does not include the 
defence of the states of Sabah and Sarawak in East 
Malaysia as it only applies to the defence of West 
Malaysia i.e. Peninsular Malaysia. Therefore, if there 
was a military clash between Malaysia and other state(s) 
over the Spratly Island in the South China Sea, Malaysia 
could not invoke the FPDA.
CONSEQUENCE OF RESISTANCE 
Disputes which arise in South East Asia region are 
concerning islands, continental shelf and the extended 
continental shelf claims, EEZ boundaries and natural 
resources emanating from the sea bed40 i.e. oil and gas, 
and the rich fi shing resource, especially in the areas of 
the disputed Spratly Islands which are highly contested 
by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei and 
Malaysia. If the disputes are not solved amicably, the 
disputes may turn into a full-out war by the state parties 
which are involved in the disputes.
The Johnson South Reef Skirmish of 1988 was a 
bloody naval battle that took place between two countries 
which were allies during the Vietnam War and shared 
the same communist ideology i.e. China and Vietnam. 
Chinese and Vietnamese forces fought over the Johnson 
South Reef in the highly disputed area of the Spratly 
Islands  on 14 March 1988. The naval dispute is also 
referred to as the Battle of Fiery Cross Reef.41 In this naval 
battle, both China and Vietnam have its own version of 
events but the aftermath of the naval battle was horrifi c 
on Vietnam’s side. There were about 75 Vietnamese 
personnel killed or reported missing in action. Three 
Vietnamese naval ships were destroyed.42 On the other 
hand, Chinese casualties were reported to be minor in 
relation to its huge losses.43 According to some sources, 
the battle lasted about 28 minutes only.
In 1995, the Chinese forces seized Mischief Reef in 
the Spratly Islands.44 Mischief Reef is a reef within the 
Philippines’ EEZ. China retreated from Mischief Reef in 
the face of a united ASEAN front.45 In order to deter any 
future confl ict in the area of the South China Sea, an 
ASEAN ministerial meeting was held in Manila in July 
1992 and the ministers made the ASEAN Declaration on 
the South China Sea (the Declaration).46
APPLICATION OF THE 1982 LOSC TO RESOLVE 
THE INEQUITIES REGARDING THE CLAIMS 
OVER THE SPRATLY ISLANDS 
The 1982 LOSC need to be applied in order to resolve 
the inequities containing in the claim over the Spratly 
Islands. Due to the position of China, as a superpower 
and a member of Security Council, regarded the whole of 
South China Sea as their Mare Nostrum or our sea to the 
Romans.47 China’s economic and military prowess have 
made such claim of dominance a reality.48 Thus, Chinese 
Nine Dotted Line Claim over the entire South China Sea 
would make countries surrounding the Spratly Islands 
have diffi culties in negotiating with China.
A legal resolution49 with China would require the 
application of the 1982 LOSC principle. In addition, 
an understanding needs to be made with China for the 
purpose of appointing an external adjudication.50 Thus, 
this presents a hurdle for the parties in getting China to 
agree to come to an understanding, let alone having it to 
agree to an external adjudication. 
If China agrees to seek a resolution by legal means, 
China would refer to Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the 1982 
LOSC51 wherein these Articles stipulate that in the case of 
overlapping EEZs and continental shelves, delimitation 
will be effected by agreement on the basis of international 
law or by the International Court of Justice in order to 
reach an equitable solution. If such agreement is reached 
within a ‘reasonable period of time’ then the parties ‘shall 
resort’ to Part XV of 1982 LOSC. The primary obligation 
of the parties as stipulated under Part XV of 1982 LOSC 
is to resolve their disputes by peaceful means52 where 
the parties “shall proceed expeditiously to an exchange 
of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or other 
peaceful means.”53 The states may resort to any means 
possible in order to resolves their disputes arising under 
the Convention.54 If the parties/states are unable to 
solve their confl icts, the parties/ states could resort to 
the compulsory and binding machinery of Section 2 of 
Part XV.55
States’ duties under the 1982 LOSC require the states 
to reach an equitable EEZ boundary agreement within 
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a reasonable time. If this fails, they are directed to the 
dispute settlement procedures in Part XV of the 1982 
LOSC. This Part XV of the 1982 LOSC prescribes forums for 
solving delimitation disputes, thereby creating a variety 
of mechanisms which include mediation, arbitration, 
conciliation and negotiation. The noble intention of 
the 1982 LOSC is to provide avenues for states to solve 
their disputes amicably. However, if a state is unwilling 
to resolve its dispute through legal means, then such 
effort to have the dispute settled is futile. Since China 
is a superpower and a member of Security Council, no 
country is able to persuade China to abide by the 1982 
LOSC principles. China has even resorted to the act of 
bullying. Since 2009, China’s act of bullying has become 
more serious and dangerous. The acts include “cutting 
cables of Vietnamese owner or chartered oil and gas 
exploration vessel, the cutting of nets, arrests of crews and 
sinking of fi shing boats on the part of several countries, 
and the loss of lives.”56
China has been insisting on using a different set of 
principles in claiming maritime boundaries, which is not 
recognised by the 1982 LOSC.57 For example, the ‘Rock’ 
as defi ned in Article 121 of 1982 LOSC as “Rocks which 
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their 
own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf.” However, China has ‘transformed’ rocks in the 
Spratly Island into ‘islands’ and structures were built on 
the ‘islands’ in order to allow human habitation. This 
‘creative interpretation’ of Article 121 of the 1982 LOSC 
is made possible for the purpose of legitimizing their 
claims on the Spratly Islands.
As such, disputes continue to persist if the 1982 LOSC 
principles is being purposely misinterpreted.58 Xavier 
Furtado points out that, “Even in those instances when the 
claimants have invoked the 1982 LOSC, it was interpreted 
selectively and, on many occasions, was deliberately 
misinterpreted. These are a series of issues that are central 
to this problem and they add to the diffi culty of applying 
the terms of the Convention to the Spratlys dispute.”59 
For example, China resorted to historic waters claim 
or historic title, however failed to take into account of 
UNCLOS principle of uninterrupted administrative control 
over Spratly Islands.60
As mentioned, the dispute of the Spratly Islands 
remains unsolved because the claimants, especially 
China, Vietnam and Taiwan, resorted to historic waters’ 
claim. China, Vietnam and Taiwan have the similar 
notions that the 1982 LOSC “supersedes historic rights 
dating from the 1400s is absurd.”61 Other reasons are that 
the claimants use ‘selective interpretations of the 1982 
LOSC.’62 The ‘selective interpretations of the 1982 LOSC’ is 
probably of the Convention’s own vague wording which 
allows claimants to interpret both ways.63
In fact, some even argued that the rights of China, 
Vietnam and Taiwan’s historical claims over the Spratly 
Islands have vanished when they have ratifi ed the 1982 
LOSC.64 In principle, it would be easy to say that none 
of the countries including China, Vietnam and Taiwan 
would use the notion of historical claims, but in practice, 
China, Vietnam and Taiwan still cling on the notion of 
historical claims.
The claimants of the Spratly Islands have even 
placed troops or build administrative cities on some 
on the Spratly Islands for the purpose of exercising 
administrative control over the area.65 Some claimants 
have even erected concrete foundations and buildings, 
built airstrips and other structures on the submerged 
reef for the purpose of keeping the reef above sea at all 
times. The reason the claimants built structures on the 
submerged reefs was because the claimants wanted to 
claim the territorial waters.66
The 1982 LOSC should not be used as an excuse by 
any states, especially China, to infringe the territorial 
sovereignty of other states. China attempts to misuse 
international laws and misinterprets the 1982 LOSC 
to serve its interests. If China chooses to abuse other 
claimants of the Spratly Islands, by for example, boarding, 
harassing and searching foreign-fl agged vessels67 in the 
areas of the Spratly Islands, this would exacerbate the 
problem further.
COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND WHICH 
ORIGINATED FROM ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (SIYAR) PROVIDES SOLUTION TO THE 
ISSUE OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS
ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (SIYAR) AND COMMON 
HERITAGE OF MANKIND
Islamic International Law or Siyar Siyar in Arabic 
means the behaviours and conducts of Prophet Muhammad 
SAW during the time of war and peace which has been 
used and adapted by Imam Abu Hanifa68 for Islamic 
international law.69 Imam Abu Hanifa also developed 
Islamic international law to use for external relations 
with other states.70 
During the times of classical Islamic jurists, Siyar 
was basically developed for the law of war (Jihad), 
which includes the rules and conducts of war, cessation 
of war, distribution of booties, treatment of prisoners, law 
of revenue and etc.71 At the same time, Siyar was also 
developed for the law of peace, such as treaty, diplomatic 
rights and privileges, and safe-conduct (Aman) toward 
non-Muslim visitors or traders for a temporary period 
of time.72 The period of friendly relationship between 
the Islamic Caliph Harun al-Rashid and Christian King 
Charlemagne resulted in Siyar being further adapted for 
external relations with other states.73 Other international 
relations between Islamic and western Christian states 
happened many times until the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire in 1923, which brought many interactions 
between Siyar and western international law.74 
This theoretical approach is the application of Islamic 
principles i.e. Islamic International Law (Siyar). Since 
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Islamic International Law (Siyar) is a very huge area, 
this article would only deal with the notion of Common 
Heritage of Mankind. 
Common Heritage of Mankind Immanuel Kant, in 
his essay ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’75, described the 
“uninhabitable parts of the earth’s surface” as belonging 
to the “Common Heritage of Mankind” in the following 
passage:
The community of man is divided by uninhabitable parts of the 
earth’s surface such as oceans and deserts, but even then, the 
ship or the camel (the ship of the desert) make it possible for 
them to approach their fellows over these ownerless tracts, and 
to utilise as a means of social intercourse that right to the earth’s 
surface which the human race shares in common.76
Thus, based on the aforesaid quotation, it is said that 
men who were divided by “uninhabitable parts of the 
earth’s surface” could interact with each another by using 
ships (sea) and camels (desert), to meet over such earth’s 
surface which naturally belongs to the human race i.e. 
Common Heritage of Mankind.
Immanuel Kant reiterated that the usage of ships and 
camels would bring distant places or continents closer. 
This is stated in the following quotation:
Continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful 
mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by public 
laws, thus bringing the human race nearer and nearer to a 
cosmopolitan constitution. . . .77
The notion of Common Heritage of Mankind is 
being adopted in Article 136 of the 1982 LOSC. The 
notion of Common Heritage of Mankind, despite being 
discussed by Immanuel Kant, is actually derived from the 
principle of Islamic law. The notion of Common Heritage 
of Mankind has parallel concept of Islamic common 
property rights78 which based on the following Hadith79 
of the Prophet Muhammad SAW:
People are partners in three things: water, pasture and salt. 
(Abu Dawood)
Thus, water (seas or rivers), pasture (farms or 
agriculture or arable land) and salt (minerals like gold, 
diamond, oil and gas) are common property and should 
not be in the hands of private ownerships but should be 
benefi tting and belonging to all people or mankind. 
From the aforesaid hadith, the classic Islamic 
scholars have interpreted their own theories and the 
teaching of Hanafi  school of thought has been codifi ed 
during the Ottoman Empire between 1869 and 1876 
which is called Majallah al-ahkam al-’adliyyah (the 
Majallah).80
For the purpose of explaining the aforesaid hadith, 
which in fact bears the same concept of Common Heritage 
of Mankind, two examples will be highlighted, namely 
water and land.
With regard to the defi nition of water, the Majallah 
explains that water actually belongs to everyone and not 
to any particular individual as it is the common property 
of mankind. Two Articles of the Majallah are described 
below:
1. Article 1235 of the Majallah
 “Water which fl ows underground is not the property 
of anyone”
2 Article 1236 of the Majallah
 “Wells which are habitually used by the public, and 
have not been produced by the work and care of any 
particular person, are things which are the common 
property of mankind and free to all to use”
3. Article 1237 of the Majallah
 “Seas and big lakes are free to all to use” 
4. Article 1264 of the Majallah
 “In the same way as everyone has the benefi t of the 
light and air, so also he can take benefi t from the seas 
and big lakes” 
With regard to the defi nition of land, the Majallah 
divides many categories of land which are free to be used 
by all, including:
1. Abandoned land (Aradi Matrukah)81
 “Places which are near towns which are left to be 
grazing grounds and places for threshing fl oors, 
and places for getting wood”82 (Article 1271 of the 
Majallah). 
2. The dead lands (Aradi Mawat)83
 “land which are not the property of anyone, and 
are not the pasture ground of a town or village, or 
for their collecting fi rewood … and are far from 
the distant parts of a village or town, that is to say, 
the sound of a person who has a loud voice cannot 
be heard from the houses which are at the extreme 
limit of the town or village”84 (Article 1270 of the 
Majallah). 
Based on the aforesaid categories of land, it can 
be deduced that the notion of public ownership of land 
which should be benefi tting and belonging to all people 
or mankind, should apply to the issue of the Spratly 
Islands. Based on the interpretation of Majallah, the 
Spratly Islands could be regarded as dead lands (Aradi 
Mawat) where the Spratly Islands are not the pasture 
ground of a town or village or far from the distant parts 
of a village or town or extreme location. In other words, 
the Spratly Islands, which could not sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own, would fall under 
the ownership of all people or mankind i.e. ‘Common 
Heritage of Mankind.’ Although Itu Aba of the Spratly 
Islands which has its own water source under Taiwan,85 
the island is without habitation and left without any 
population except for Taiwanese coastguard personnel 
and military personnel stationed on Itu Aba that were 
brought in by the Taiwanese government.86 Therefore, 
Itu Aba has no independent economic life of its own. 
Article 121(3) of the 1982 LOSC requires that the relevant 
“economic life” feature must be “of their own.”87 Thus, an 
artifi cial economic life supported by a distant population 
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in order to gain control over an extended maritime zone 
is not suffi cient.88
In the beginning of the 20th Century, the international 
community began to accept the principles of Islamic 
law of the sea. Elisabeth Mann Borgese89 was a world 
government activist and she was described as the “the 
Mother of the Oceans” or “the First Lady of the Oceans” 
for her role in crafting and promoting the principle of 
Islamic law of the sea in the 1982 LOSC.90 Elisabeth 
Mann Borgese introduced the principle of ‘Common 
Heritage of Mankind.’ This concept is so much alike 
to the Islamic law of the sea where the High Sea could 
not be owned by any nation as it is opened to everyone. 
In the concept enunciated by Elisabeth Mann Borgese 
relating to ‘Common Heritage of Mankind,’ poor 
countries have equal standing with advanced countries 
whereby poor countries have “a right to share in the 
resources that had been declared to be the Common 
Heritage of Mankind.”91 In furtherance of Article 136, 
Article 137 discusses the legal status of the area and 
its resources. 
In the 1982 LOSC, the notion of three bodies of seas, 
which were enunciated by the Islamic law of the sea, 
was applied. However, the 1982 LOSC allows the coastal 
states to control “over all resources and economic uses 
in a 200-mile zone.” The sovereignty over bodies of seas 
which include the EEZ is borrowed from the Islamic law 
of the sea.92 
In regard to the Common Heritage of Mankind, 
Elisabeth Mann Borgese might have been inspired by the 
following Quranic verses where the al-Quran considers 
everything in nature as the common property of all 
creatures, be it animals or mankind. There are Quranic 
verses to support this contention, namely Surah Al-Anam, 
Verse 6:6 and Surah Ibrahim, Verse 14:19-20. In Surah 
Al-Anam, Verse 6:6, Allah SWT says:
Have they not seen how many generations before them we have 
annihilated? We established them on earth more than we did for 
you, and we showered them with blessings, generously, and we 
provided them with fl owing streams. We then annihilated them 
because of their sins, and we substituted another generation 
in their place. (To Succeed them). In Surah Ibrahim, Verse 
14:19-20, Allah SWT says: Seest thou not that Allah created the 
heavens and the earth in Truth? If He so will, He can remove 
you and put (in your place) a new creation? Nor is that for Allah 
any great matter.
Al-Quran regards all elements found in nature as 
belonging to Allah SWT and all creatures have rights upon 
them as they are common property for all. According to 
Islamic law, the basic elements of nature such as land, 
water, air, fi re, forests and sunlight are considered to be 
the common property of all creatures.93 Thus, human 
beings’ right to use the natural resources is regarded as 
usufruct.94
Although Common Heritage of Mankind is a 
concept derived from Islamic principles, the authorship 
of the term ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ is somehow 
controversial.95 There are two other individuals that claim 
authorship of Common Heritage of Mankind, namely:
1. A.A Cocca, an Argentinean ambassador96; and
2. Dr. Arvid Pardo, a Maltese ambassador.97
A.A Cocca refers to the 75th Meeting of the 5th Session 
of the Legal Subcommittee of Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) which was held 
on 19 June 1967 where he said that “the international 
community has recognized the existence of a new 
subject of international law, namely mankind itself and 
had created a ius humanitatis (…) the international 
community has endowed that new subject of international 
law-mankind-with the vested common property (res 
communis humantatis), which the human mind could at 
present conceive of, namely, outer space itself, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies.”98 Thus, A.A Cocca 
refers to mankind and common property.99
Dr. Arvid Pardo made a speech proposal on 1 
November 1967 before the General Assembly’s fi rst 
Committee that the deep seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction and the resources thereof should be declared 
as the ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ and used for only 
peaceful purposes.100
THE APPLICATION OF COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND 
IS AN ALTERNATIVE OPTION TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The Notion of Common Heritage of Mankind is an 
alternative option to dispute settlement arising on the 
issue of Spratly Islands. The Notion of Common Heritage 
of Mankind is relation to the natural resources of the 
seabed and subsoil beyond the outer limit of 200 nm EEZ is 
generally governed by the provisions on the deep seabed 
in Part XI of 1982 LOSC. According to Article 136 of the 
1982 LOSC, the area which is the outer limit of 200 nm 
and the resources that rest in the deep seabed are regarded 
as the common heritage of mankind. Furthermore, 
Article 137(1) says that no state can claim or exercise 
sovereignty over the resources. Article 137(2) stipulates 
that the resources of the area are vested in mankind as 
a whole. Article 137(3) stipulates that no states shall 
acquire or exercise rights upon the minerals recovered 
from the area.
The role of China in the claim concerning the Spratly 
Islands is relatively huge as China claims the largest 
portion of territory based on the Chinese defi nition of 
“nine-dash line” which stretches hundreds of miles south 
and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.101
Colonel (L) Syed Abdillah bin Dato Syed Hussein 
Alkaff, a retired high ranking offi cer from Royal Navy 
of Brunei,102 was of the view that the status of the Spratly 
Islands should be regarded as common heritage of 
mankind which no nation could own the Spratly Islands. 
All countries including China should waive its rights in 
claiming the Spratly Islands as the problem with China 
is that China claims every inch of the Spratly Islands. He 
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further stressed that any oil exploration conducted on that 
area should have a mandate from the United Nations and 
any proceeds obtained shall be shared equally with states 
which have common maritime borders with the Spratly 
Islands.103 However, if nations which have common 
maritime borders with the Spratly Islands do not agree on 
the proportion of the oil proceeds, the Spratly Islands shall 
be left untouched. Any developments, explorations of 
minerals and fi shing activities should not be allowed. The 
Spratly Islands, he further stressed, should be regarded 
as a sanctuary or haven for many species of fi sh.104 Thus, 
the principle of Common Heritage of Mankind which 
Elisabeth Mann Borgese105 promoted as the principle 
of Islamic Law of the Sea in the 1982 LOSC106 could be 
applied in the issue of the Spratly Islands.
CONCLUSION
The solution provided by the Common Heritage of 
Mankind which originated from Islamic International 
Law (Siyar) provides solution to the issue of the Spratly 
Islands would provide the best solution to the dispute 
of the Spratly Islands. It is, with hope, that the solution 
provided by the Common Heritage of Mankind which 
originated from Islamic International Law (Siyar) is 
palatable to all state parties, namely Vietnam, Brunei, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, China and also Taiwan and would 
provide peace and stability to the region as a whole and 
be a win-win solution for all. 
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where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special 
circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in 
a way which is at variance with this provision.”
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